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Dog on a leash
In the summer of 2012, I travel for a few days to a small Mediterranean Island in Greece.1 
On a beach, the majestic blue of the Peloponnesian sea contrasts to the pale bodies recov-
ering from oppressive workdays by flaunting bellies and backs. I see a family lying a few 
meters away from me. The family has a daughter, whose age is probably six or seven. The 
girl catches my attention. A simple rope is loosely tied around her neck. As if to counter 
the otiose abandon of her surroundings, she quickly plods through the sand on all four 
extremities, as if she were a canid animal. She is careful not to use her knees or elbows, 
but only her entire legs and arms stretched to their limits causing some difficulty. The 
spirited trudging stirs up sand and annoys some tourists. But the girl does not care and 
her mother does not discipline her. In a practiced mimicker, she pulls out her tongue and 
offers an empty stare. She cants her head and then raises her eyebrows – maybe an at-
tempt to move her ears up and down in the way of dogs. At an unoccupied sitting bench 
shaded by an open umbrella, she begins to sniffle. Her mother keeps on holding the rope 
1 I follow my countrymen to one of their most prized tourist destinations in Europe since 
the 1970s. Germans frequently choose Greece, and especially the country’s myriad of 
Mediterranean Islands, for the exquisite repose they offer. Indeed, it was the first time 
I came to see the splendor of this part of the world. To Germans, Greece combines the 
exoticism of what is deemed an ancient civilization with the recuperative calmness requi-
site for an affluent middle class (under which lies hidden an old concern about the politi-
cal incalculability of the Balkans). It is curious to realize, however, that the same qualities 
that attracted tourists became reinterpreted as sluggish and indulgent once that country’s 
economic problems became pronounced object of debates in German news media. The 
connection between the decidedly positive and restorative experience of Greece and its 
default on national debt was made only indirectly through the invocation of Alltagskul-
tur (everyday culture, quotidian way of life) in a strangely punitive register. Germans 
resented that Greeks had borrowed money in excess in order to buy goods, including 
those imported from Germany. Hence, some of the discussions in the media can only be 
described as bizarre. They remained clueless and unperturbed exactly by what Germans 
de facto sought there: a market for German goods and a laid-back holiday atmosphere. 
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in a defeated pose. After walking her daughter for a while, she lets go of it and returns 
to her blanket to read a book. The daughter, unperturbed by sudden desertion, lifts her 
head, looks at the sea standing on all fours, panting. She tries catching waves with her 
snout, but, curiously, never attempts to bark.
For the duration of her performance the girl apparently wanted to be a dog, not a 
little girl. How did the girl’s excitement come about? Did she render a general member 
of the species or, perchance, a specific one? She could have had those in mind that fre-
quently appear as images posing in photographs, barking on screens, talking in animated 
movies; or live-ones that cower under seats in trains and huddle in busses of Europeans 
cities. To be sure there was nothing cartoonish in her execution; if anything it appeared 
somewhat robotic. Was it a Greek or a German dog? And would that even make any 
difference? Her model could have been the dog that was left at home while the family 
was on vacation; or a neighbor’s pet inclusive of a proper name and a specific look. She 
could have played the one she hoped her parents had acquired but never did – an attempt 
to compensate for her longing. While I cannot say where her model came from, at some 
point the girl relented to an impulse to realistically imitate the animal. It is unclear when 
she first took hold of the image of a dog.
Whatever provided the initial spark to this girl’s movements insufficiently explains 
the vividness of a detailed performance. While the dog played by the girl explored a 
beach, the girl playing dog explored the animal’s movements. This play was a form of 
labor but that term does not truly catch what she did. Judging by the leash, her perfor-
mance was not a first one, yet her movements were far from routine. I got the impression 
that the girl realized that a dog on a beach can only be a dog on a beach. The animal has 
no possibility to escape that predicament and it was exactly this insight that the girl made 
vividly present. But to whom? Pressing on from movement to movement, she yielded to 
all the canid motions her body could muster following what appeared like the contours 
of an image. It was a realistic display despite the obvious limits the human physical struc-
ture poses when corporally performing a canine.2 Undoubtedly she became absorbed 
in this activity. Given that she was so entirely neglectful of her surroundings, I cannot 
reduce her activity to the presence of an immediate audience. I eventually got tired ob-
serving her. It is arduous to interpret the girl’s behavior any further without knowing a lot 
more about her affection for animals, the relation to her parents as well as their relation 
to dogs, and myriad of other things.
2 In writing I, too, encounter limits of descriptive exposition in order to account for her 
activity. I compensate by choosing verbs that suggest to the reader the expected behavior 
of a dog: sniffle, pant, plod, trudge (instead of smell, crawl, breathe, or walk). A more 
neutral representation of the girl’s exact movements would become too cumbersome if 
not altogether surpass my skill of expository writing. The girl, it must be said, only mo-
ved her body and made very slight noises while she played. It is me who interprets these 
movements as representing a dog.
While this girl’s level of absorption was pronounced, we are usually not particularly 
surprised by our ability to mimic other species.3 We conceptualize this ability through 
reference to mind, the mediator between the actual dog, its mental representation (idea) 
and the acting person providing their interface. One can understand her performance as 
a form of interpretation. Her physical movements were focused on the concrete forms 
that dog behavior takes. In the kinetic pattern she enacted we can see what about dog 
must have made a lasting impression on her. While the image of a dog is understood to 
come from without (she must have seen one at some point), it is in her memory that we 
believe such material to be located. The mimicry is thus understood first and foremost as 
a mental or psychic fact that becomes externalized through corporeal motility.
If we consider alternatives to such an understanding, more interesting possibilities 
emerge. When a girl moves like a dog, how is it that we rarely suspect an actual dog to be 
moving within her? Nor do we normally assume that the image of a dog has an autono-
mous force over her arms and legs compelling and coordinating movements against her 
will. We do not say that the girl is inhabited by a dog. And if we do, we are understood 
to deploy metaphor. What becomes dog in the girl is not conceptualized as ›spirit‹ or 
›breath‹ making itself present by leaving its mark, the contagion of a separate existence to 
which her body readily ceded. Rather, we understand it to be the girl that makes present 
to herself a dog, whether as image or idea, which dwells permanently within her. 
The consequence of such conventional understandings are vast. Were the girl exhib-
iting too excessive a need to play; if she insisted to be dog for good, or to have always 
been a dog in the first place, we would likely employ a psychological language in order 
to diagnose a pathological condition. If the girl insisted she was puppet to a dog, and not 
vice versa, we would consider this silly nonsense, a funny game of reversal at best. The 
only legitimate agent we are accustomed to accept is the girl, or her thinking mind, and 
3 In the Western world (roughly speaking) the image of dog-on-a-leash is nothing unusual. 
There are many kinds of animal personifications that children may perform. In my own 
childhood, I distinctively recall a high school excursion to Glienicker Brücke in south-
west Berlin (part of former West Germany), not far from the city of Potsdam (former 
East Germany). In view of the bridge separating the two countries, a group of female 
classmates suddenly took to trotting and neighing like horses for several hours as if they 
were riding over sloping hills covering an idyllic British countryside. They played ›Black 
Beauty‹ and other such animal figures from contemporary adaptions that encouraged an 
identification with animal characters (the original novel Black Beauty: The Autobiography 
of a Horse was written by Anna Sewell and published in 1877). The horse is an animal 
that needs a horizon into which it can run. As if in response to the stifling atmosphere 
of walled-in Berlin, they imagined an open countryside of green hills stretching into 
an uninterrupted expanse. In another example, a childhood friend of mine, a few years 
my junior, was obsessed with pigs and anything having to do with these animals: their 
various shapes and colors, their snouts, their habits of eating, their oinking and squeal-
ing. Her father was originally from Bavaria and for a while a member of the extremist 
Bewegung 2. Juni—a great cook of southern German cuisine caught in the culinary desert 
of left-leaning Berlin. In both examples, the animals in question (horse and pig, respec-
tively), while performed or otherwise represented in their typified behaviors, were un-
ambiguously anthropomorphized. The point was to do as animal what one anyway does: 
playing with friends. The girl described above, by contrast, seemingly becomes a dog. In 
her performance she was alone.
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thus any behavior deemed overly compulsive would quickly suggest mental, psychologi-
cal, or cognitive illness.4 The only legitimate object we accept is dog, a word and concept 
with clearly defined semantic content. What remains noteworthy in the way we conceive 
bodily impulses to move and play is what becomes implicitly foreclosed: that which our 
categories and conventional logic quickly pass over and resist speculating. Surprising 
remains also the square confidence with which we engage in such straight interpretation. 
We know from various contexts that images can haunt and possess us momentarily, in 
wake or in dreams, even for longer periods of time. We know that the power of signifi-
cation of, say, a word, can far surpass our ability to control. When we try to articulate 
what left an impression on us, the elements are frequently channeled into the way we 
express that experience. And yet this girl’s behavior appears an unlikely candidate for all 
such interpretations, because we expect children to engage in behavior that is playfully 
explorative, apparently useless, and frequently embarrassing. And so, we leave it at that. 
Marcel Jousse, French anthropologist and fervent advocate of an Anthropologie du 
Geste, had a different way of conceptualizing human mimetic behavior. In his work we 
encounter a plethora of highly suggestive terms, such as algébrosé, bilateralisé, or mi- 
mismologique, with which he tried to account for the mysterious mechanisms by which 
gesture, bodily comportment and movement interact with the world, that is, how actions 
act upon actions. I stumbled upon him by sheer coincidence while browsing French ac-
ademic bookshops for unknown treasures. In several librairies on rue des Écoles in Paris, 
I made his acquaintance by repeatedly recognizing his name on covers adorning the 
shelves. Most of my French interlocutors had little to say about his work.
Following Aristotle’s initial averment that man was the most mimetic of creatures, 
Jousse defined behavior, such as the girl’s play of a dog described above, as mimisme 
interactionnel. Interactive, because in human bodily expression he determined a fluidity 
between agent, act, and the object acted-upon (»Mimisme triphasées: l’agent, l’agissant, 
et l’agi«; Jousse 1974: 47). Humans incessantly receive, register, and replay what he called 
mimèmes, amassed through the receptive mechanisms of the human body. Because re-
ality was ultimately inaccessible, Jousse had it, humans were dependent on this ability to 
interiorize. Throughout his work, Jousse deploys the word intussusceptionner to account 
for this continual work of corporeal integration. Intussusceptionner describes the move-
ment of making internal to the self. It is taken from the domain of cellular biology to 
account for the way cells incorporate external materials (alternatively, in physiology the 
term denotes phenomena of intestinal invagination). 
For Jousse, to know an object means to integrate it via intussusception, which is prior 
to mental activity whether it concerns idea, concept, image, or model. It is through in-
corporating reality via mimesis, by replaying what the real has inflicted on the body, that 
man himself becomes modeled by what he called le réel. Humans become possessed by a 
reality that incessantly invades them: 
4 The condition of echopraxia, for example, is defined as a reactive compulsive need to 
repeat and imitate something. 
»A ces profondeurs-là, l’homme est tout entier intuitivement envahi et modelé par le réel. 
Il est comme possédé par son envahisseur qu’il exprime et balance selon la structure 
de son organisme. Le Mimeur devient en quelque sorte l’être mimé et connu dans ses 
gestes et il en fait comme une nouvelle incarnation« (Jousse 1974: 55).5
Jousse dismissed a reductive understanding of mimetic behavior as mere execution of 
images located in the mind, which become externalized. In his understanding, mimisme, 
or miming, is not the same as to mimic or to imitate.6 The problem with conceptualizing 
the girl’s physical rendering of a dog as manifestation of an image is that her movements 
are then reduced to a conscious, agentive, and finite form: the dog suggested in her move-
ments appears as a complete thing in itself – a Platonian ›idea‹ which she acted out on 
the beach. She engaged in an instrumental action, the aim of which was to portray a 
dog. We are usually satisfied with such abbreviated explanations because the image or 
idea of a dog exists also in the mind of the observer, that is, in us. By observing her act, 
I come to recognize the dog that she plays. The girl and I come to share in an image and 
by extension, in the idea suggested. Hence, the conclusion goes, the idea or image of the 
dog lies at the origin of her behavior. In this way we confuse ›communication‹, the way 
we make sense of things and give meaning to what we perceive, with a more prior level 
of interaction: the way the world becomes integrated through the senses of the body 
(intussusception). 
The dog that I recognize in her movements and that I can enunciate in speech or 
written discourse is not equal to her experience of motility. In reality, Jousse had it, the 
child’s play is a creative and sensuous inquiry caused by prior mimetic dramas (mi-
modrames) and constantly generating new ones. It is not predicated on the idea of dog. 
The girl, by relinquishing herself to the moments intuited, comes to know herself in a 
novel incarnation. There is an element of possession at work in which the mimer be-
comes the being mimed. As Jousse had it, »le Mimeur devient […] l’être mimé« (Jousse 
5 »On this level, man is entirely invaded intuitively and modeled on the basis of the real. 
He is like possessed by his invader who expresses and balances him on the basis of the 
structure of his organism. The Mimer, in a way, becomes the being mimed and known in 
his gestures. He acts as if it were a new incarnation« [translation P.G.-F.).
6 Marcel Jousse juxtaposes la Mimique with le Mimisme, the former being an animal re-
action, the latter a universal human characteristic (1974: 59-62). La mimique is a form 
of imitative behavior by the Anthropoid, while mimisme is what Anthropos does when 
engaging in mimetic replay by conquering the vital force of reality (61). Note that the girl, 
instead of playing a mere dog, could very well have played an actress playing a dog. She 
could have copied her classmate who told her that she once played a dog. She could have 
impersonated her father who under a spell was transformed miraculously into a dog; or 
played a cat that inhabits a dog; or a dog playing a girl (e.g. herself) who tries to move like 
a dog. Was she aping of dog trying to play a girl that moves like a girl, playing a dog? Or, 
a robot that moves like a four-legged animal? Her energetic performance contrasting to 
the slow and sluggish atmosphere of her surroundings, she perhaps sought a world that 
could confront the boring scene at the beach. The possibilities are sizable. On the level 
of bodily enervation, the separation of subject and object, or agent, act, and acted-upon, 
cannot be assumed to be as clearly defined as it tends to appear in written or spoken 
form. 
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1974: 55). It is, I believe, this aspect of her performance, the way she yielded repetitively 
to specific corporeal intuitions, that caught my attention and made me observe her with 
curiosity for a long while. I was able to see a level of absorption that suggested more than 
mere execution of finite forms. Ideas and images are things to which I have easy cognitive 
access. This girl, however, at least for the duration of her feverish play, was somewhere 
where I was not. While the dog displayed by her body did not seem in any way extraor-
dinary, the girl she had become, definitely was. 
For Jousse, to play and replay what gets to be understood as ›dog‹ through one’s body 
is not the same as representing the animal in written form on paper in word or image. It 
is a somatic interaction in a register that is foundational but never equal to how language 
represents. The process is more elementary than a conception of mental appropriation or 
the exhibition of ideas. When we use words, we tend to loose the initial concreteness of 
the thing (la chose) that visited itself on the body. Through the distance of abstraction we 
gain the ability to transport, preserve, and share meaning – what we call ›communica-
tion‹. In mimetic replay, by contrast, it is the very concreteness of the thing that remains 
the object of exploration. The coherence of an object mimetically replayed can never be 
outright assumed, nor the coherence of the subject engaging in the activity of physical in-
tegration. The subject looses itself in the act: it becomes absorbed and an object to larger 
forces at work. The directionality of the forces that affect the body are hard to determine 
because its point of departure is blurred. It is obfuscated because the tool by which we 
describe this experience, language, is based on specific metaphysical assumptions. The 
coherence and boundedness of an idea as posed in language can only be achieved in the 
domain of words, writing, and thought, which are a distance removed from the corporeal 
play of mimisme. It is only in the domain of language that we come to speak confidently 
of a subject and an object ordered by a conventional syntax: a girl is playing a dog.
On closer inspection, in the little drama described above, it never becomes entirely 
clear who is the object and who is the subject in the flow of action. Is the girl playing 
a dog, or indeed, is the girl played by a dog? Mimetic interactivity furiously oscillates 
actor, act, and acted-upon (»jeu triphasées de l’agent, l’agissant, et l’agi«).7 Says Jousse: 
7 For Marcel Jousse, the cardinal sin of French civilization is to have equated writing (style 
écrit) with civilization (1974: 33). It is through the mysterious, while apparently irresist-
ible, human tendency to stereotype gestures into a formalism that human expression 
became pushed from the concrete to what he refers to as l’algébrisme; and from there to 
the negative quality of l’algébrosisme of the current age. The latter is a form of necrotic 
petrification caused by a Greco-Latin heritage that has become distorted by eliding the 
elementary foundation of all human expression in mimetic play: in the meaning of con-
cepts, proverbs, ideas, images, words, narratives, memories. This so-called civilization 
has become obsessed with what he calls graphisme in a livresque environment in which 
things (choses) can no longer speak and are no longer heard (Jousse 1974: 74, 82, and 
109-112). In order to counter the metaphysical baggage of Cartesianism, he introduced 
a plethora of terms, complex and mutually imbricated such as mimage and mimodrame, 
which have a tendency to become too frequent in his prose. By applying this complex 
terminology, Jousse apparently sought to defamiliarize the reader with talking, reciting, 
playing, writing, reading, acting and other quotidian activities, while simultaneously ac-
counting for the hidden but ubiquitous mimetic behavior of the Anthropos underlying 
all of these. 
»L’Homme normal est joué par le Réel qui se réverbère en lui« (1974: 58).8 Hence, the 
girl, by integrating what addresses her corporally as part of the world to which she 
belongs, herself becomes object to that world played by the vital forces within it (i.e. 
»joué par le Réel«, as Jousse put it).9 It is indispensable, then, that in conceptualizing 
human mimetic activity, we account for the metaphysical distortion that the application 
of words and concepts, derived from a domain removed from bodily experience, ulti-
mately tend to engender. The corporeal dimension of experience is not of the same as 
the order of language, which organizes experience into disciplined articulation: syntax, 
narrative, classification, discourse. In these representations, the real that reverberates 
inside the body, cannot easily be accounted for. Jousse assumed that children, as well as 
societies not yet marred by a Greco-Latin influence or living under the cultural domi-
nation of the written form, offered cogent examples for a more ›spontaneous‹ relation 
to the way reality undergoes intussusception by the human body. Jousse believed that 
French education in its civilizing mission took away the ability of children to relate mi-
metically to the world: (»L’enfant sage est l’enfant immobile« (1974: 74).10 The same logic 
that reduces the mimetic drama to a girl is playing a dog might interpret a permanent 
absorption in that activity as a girl has lost her mind. 
Notwithstanding the spirited way in which Marcel Jousse developed his arguments, 
there is much that remains unclear. How are experiences that do not become articulated 
in language, and thus not expressed through ideas, present to the perceptual apparatus of 
the human body, its sensorium? How is the perception of the world structured by images; 
and what distinguishes an image from an idea? Young children, as well as other organ-
isms, engage in mimetic behavior without having any access to language or even prior to 
its acquisition. By consequence, it is correct to say that one cannot confidently speak of 
›ideas‹ at work. Images, on the other hand, seem to precede the acquisition of language. 
In visual perception light falls onto the retina of the eye and is registered without neces-
sarily passing through those parts of the brain identified with linguistic function. People 
usually classified as ›blind‹ have been shown to actually ›see‹ through detailed images, 
even if lacking color, when moving through structured space. 
The Viennese-born British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein argued that young infants 
fantasize the mother’s breast through imaginative thinking whenever it is absent (Klein 
1937: 308). Confronted with the need to cognize or feel a separation, internal objects are 
created when dealing with the world. These objects attempt to capture feelings but also 
images. Are not hallucinations readily transported by images? The French psychoana-
8 »Ordinary man is played by the Real which reverberates within him« [translation 
P.G.-F.]. It remains open to conjecture what Jousse exactly meant by »ordinary man« 
(»l’homme normale«), but most likely man unencumbered by graphisme, algébrisme and 
algébrosisme. 
9 The three arenas that provided Jousse with most of his insights were the spontaneous mi-
metic play of young children (laboratoire du foyer maternel), societies considered more 
attuned with bodily impression and expression (laboratoire des peuples spontanés), and 
clinical psychiatry (laboratoire tragique des cliniques psychiatrique). 
10 »The well-behaved child is the immobile child«, because sage (here meaning well-be-
haved) presupposes education, discipline, and civilization curtailing the work of intus-
susception. 
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lyst Jacques Lacan suggested a mirror-stage as a vital period for the development of the 
human child. In this early stage, determined by the particularly pronounced pre-mat-
uration in human infants, the young child comes to identify with an external image in 
the field of vision. Unlike monkeys, who soon find this game of mimicry utterly useless, 
the human child »[…] playfully experiences the relationship between the movements 
made in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and 
the reality it duplicates – namely, the child’s own body, and the persons and even things 
around him« (Lacan 2002 [1966]: 3). There is a transformation that takes place when the 
subject is captured by an image, a vital-one, which allows the child to establish mastery 
over the body and overcome the fragmentary nature of early corporeal experience. The 
developmental accomplishment, however, is not reached through proper integration of 
what Jousse called le réel, but through relating to a specular image. The specular empha-
sizes the visual field that underlies all later captivation by images. In order to master 
the body, the child must mis-recognize itself in the movements of an external object. 
Identification with an image explains the later need to symbolize the permanence of the 
I, the ego. The center of this I remains blurred, marred by an alienating core, the initial 
moment of mis-recognition of the self that the specular image engendered. In that sense 
the subject remains possessed.
It is unlikely that children in non-literate societies, those that Jousse considered 
»spontanées«, even when fundamentally different than our own, are entirely occluded 
from such early forms of social inscription. Yet, what remains internal and external to 
an emerging I, the relation to temporality or permanence, does remain a question open 
to ethnographic investigation. It appears that by not offering precise definitions of what 
constitutes ›idea‹, and by too narrow a definition of what is understood by ›image‹ and 
›writing«, Marcel Jousse’s formulations remain limited and beg the question. It is exactly 
when we initially confront ›reality‹ that the work of imagination becomes permanently 
inscribed in our psyche. This is so because the experience of what is considered real in-
cludes a libidinal attachment to objects, that is, an organization of what becomes internal 
or external to the entity that eventually ends up delineating the ›I‹. In sum, the way bodily 
integrity was initially established is inseparable from an imaginary relation to the moth-
er’s body. Only much later do these experiences in their elements become organized and 
expressed in language, which, pace Lacan, introduces desire and lack.
The shimmering of a heat haze: images of passiones
Godfrey Lienhardt, a British ethnographer who worked for two years among the Dinka 
pastoralists of Southern Sudan, described a very different situation than that of the girl 
on the beach described at the beginning of this paper. According to him, at the time of 
his field research in the late 1940s, the Dinka had no conception of mind as an entity 
that stores up experiences which later are recalled as traces. There is, in Dinka under-
standing, no automatic reliance on a mediating space between the experiencing self and 
exterior influences acting directly upon that self at any given moment. The world and 
the psyche are not separate in a way that would make such interpretations significant 
(Lienhardt 1961: 149-150). While the Dinka had an understanding of themselves as ac-
tive, self-assertive, inquiring, and acquisitive, they characterized agency differently when 
it confronted experiences of death and suffering (Lienhardt 1961: 53). The mechanism 
by which the Dinka frequently interpreted said afflictions provided an understanding, 
where the agents responsible were not necessarily located in the acting person. Instead 
of a conception of mind, the Dinka had a flexible understanding of various forces called 
nhialic, atiep, jok, or yath. Lienhardt loosely translated these forces as ›Powers‹ for lack 
of a better English term. These ultra-human forces, ›Powers‹, while significantly different 
in quality from humans, co-inhabited the physical and social world of the Dinka. They 
could become located within individuals but were also found in the sky or appeared in 
various objects and animals.11
While the Dinka’s conceptualization of the phenomenal world was not limited to 
a play of such forces, they frequently interpreted particular experiences as caused by 
them (Lienhardt 1961: 148). Some of these forces, such as ›clan-divinities‹ (yath), were 
fundamentally tied to conceptions of what we might call kinship. They were named after 
various animals (e.g. hedgehog), weather conditions (e.g. rain, thunder), substances (e.g. 
quivering meat, excrement), diseases (e.g. smallpox), body parts (e.g. thighbone), quo-
tidian activities (e.g. sweeping), and other implements or aspects in Dinka life without 
any strict limitation or rule as to what could be included and what could not (Lienhardt 
1961: 104-146). ›Clan-divinities‹ were inherited by an ancestor. When the ethnographer 
asked what he himself should invoke as his own clan-divinity, he was told, only half-jok-
ingly: »Typewriter, Paper, and Lorry«. In the Dinka view, these items represented the 
qualities and abilities of the ethnographer’s own agnatic descent (Lienhardt 1961: 110). 
›Free-divinities‹, by contrast, were associated more readily with nature. While both 
›clan‹ and ›free-divinities‹ were considered related to humans beings, the latter frequent-
ly forced this relation upon individual Dinka (Lienhardt 1961: 104). Mostly considered 
formless, ›free-divinities‹ were representable through emblems, color, and other asso-
ciations. They never appeared directly but manifested themselves in the behaviors of 
men causing illness and possession (Lienhardt 1961: 80-81). They also spoke through 
the mouth of the afflicted making various requests (Lienhardt 1961: 57). Addressed in 
hymns circulating in Dinka territory and sung at various occasions, one ›free-divinity‹ 
was considered anti-social and needed to be ritually expiated. Finally there was a third 
category called simply ›Divinity‹ (nhialic), a universal entity known by many different 
names. While ›Divinity‹ was associated with the former two forces, it could be assimila-
ted to conceptions of other people’s divinities such as the Nuer Kwoth, the Muslim Allah, 
or the Christian God (Lienhardt 1961: 57).
Lienhardt saw the basis for Dinka conceptualizations of ›Powers‹ in a particular 
configuration of human experience tied to how the phenomenal world was manifest-
ly perceived. It was in concrete and direct encounters that ›Powers‹ were made vividly 
present to the Dinka. Dismissing scholarly interpretations that sought to define a par-
11 It is important to note the fluidity of these conceptions and to resist misconstruing them 
as part of a systematic Dinka eschatology. According to Lienhardt, the Dinka showed 
little interest to elaborate intrinsic qualities or relations between ›Powers‹.
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ticular ›creed‹ or to systematize a ›pantheon of Powers‹, Lienhardt insisted that Dinka 
religion began with experience of the natural and social world. Especially in relation to 
clan-divinities, the Dinka confronted a correspondence between experience and various 
›Powers‹ (Lienhardt 1961: 96-97). Lienhardt offered the example of Ajak, a troubled Din-
ka youth, falling possessed by a ›free-divinity‹ several times during the ethnographer’s 
presence. During possession, Ajak’s movements did not resemble anything an observer 
could easily recognize as the image of an animal. The contours of a finite object did not 
appear. Rather, his were chaotic movements, suggesting a loss of control over the motor 
functions of the body, dissociation and danger. In the Dinka conception ›Powers‹ seize 
(dom) and wake-up (pac) in human bodies. They appear in them »like the shimmering 
of a heat-haze« (Lienhardt 1961: 58). The audience of the performance addressed the 
afflicted as a ›Power‹ and understood his behavior as expression of the entity’s will. Yet, 
exactly which ›Power‹ had seized him was initially unclear and had to be established 
through the probing labor of diviners. There was no conception of mind here, that Ajak, 
whether momentarily or for a longer period of time, could have lost. 
In one of the quintessential passages of the monograph, in order to find an analytical 
term that could be juxtaposed to individual agentive action, Lienhardt introduced the 
word passiones. As in the older employment of the English word ›passions‹, Dinka ›Po-
wers‹ were the »images of human passiones seen as the active sources of those passiones« 
(Lienhardt 1961: 151). ›Powers‹ caused people to become ill, experience sickness, and fall 
into bouts of possession in particular moments of affliction. Their names and demands 
were matters to be discovered and revealed through the help of religious specialists. Ac-
tive forces became ›imaged‹ through reference to various ›Powers‹. Lienhardt explicitly 
prefered the verb ›to image‹ in lieu of the verb ›to represent‹ (Lienhardt 1961: 147), I sus-
pect, to bring home the fact that ›imaging‹ was not simply a form of mental activity, the 
execution of an idea. Once articulated as ›Powers‹, these forces became available to ritual 
action. When a ›Power‹ had entered a particular medium, the afflicted was understood 
to be that ›Power‹ – an identification similar to that in Dinka sacrifice. Afflictions usually 
resulted from moral neglect, having missed the opportunity to show avoidance or respect 
(both rendered as thek in Dinka language). In the case of Ajak, for example, possession 
was preceded by the sudden death of his father to whom he had held a troubled relation-
ship since birth (Lienhardt 1961: 57-63). On previous occasions, his father’s ghost had 
seized him, tried to injure him, and had also appeared in his dreams (Lienhardt 1961: 
60). During possession, however, it was the ›free-divinity‹ Macardit (»the great black 
one«) who had become present in the young man’s body and tried to seriously harm him 
by leading the youth to a crocodile infested river during trance (Lienhardt 1961: 61-62). 
Lienhardt elaborated how the symbolic mechanism of ritual, which included the frequent 
arrangements of animal sacrifices, were means by which the Dinka coped with ›Powers‹. 
In this way the Dinka were able to manipulate their own experiences of the phenomenal 
world to which these forces, and their various effects, fundamentally belonged. 
In sum, for the Dinka the agent of affliction is not conceptualized in the mind, but 
in certain forces that can seize a body and needed to be properly named, addressed, con-
trolled and propitiated. The labor of identification of this force at hand was performed 
by other members of society, not the afflicted themselves. Had the girl on the beach de-
scribed above been a Dinka of Southern Sudan in the 1940s, it is possible that repeated 
renditions of a dog in such high quality might have predisposed her. Such spirited dis-
plays might have become understood as a sign of invisible forces at work, a foreign will 
that made itself present. To me the girl’s rendition seemed to suggest a dog in a straight-
forward manner, while Ajak’s physical contortions remained an object of interpretation 
involving other community members. Lienhardt’s descriptions are homologous, but not 
equal to Jousse’s formulations of invasion and possession. Significantly, Lienhardt point-
ed out that he never saw children considered possessed among the Dinka (Lienhardt 
1961: 59). By consequence, it is hard to follow Jousse’s attempt to delink corporeal mi-
metic play from cultural content: images, dreams, hymns, color symbolism. The Dinka 
were not peuples spontanés and, however flexible the organization of their experience, 
ideas about the world did seem to play a vital role in the way they conceptualized bodily 
afflictions in correspondence with various ›Powers‹.
What remains important is that Dinka interpretation did not need to presuppose 
›mind‹ as a mediator between subject and object to make sense of what effects the body. 
Bodies were invaded by forces foreign to them. These forces were imaged as ›Powers‹ and 
confronted in ritual. For Western-educated readers, the girl on the beach was under the 
influence of an image. With Lienhardt’s Dinka one could interpret this image as an entity, 
an actual subject in the world imaged as dog-on-a-leash. But then, of course, the girl was 
not a Dinka and the Dinka do not usually sunbathe on Greek islands. 
Ecstatic mimesis
One of the more spectacular examples of an external address that becomes mimetically 
replayed in the body comes from the ethnography of Elizabeth Colson published in the 
late 1960s (1969: 69-103), based on fieldwork from the mid 1950s. Colson, an US-Amer-
ican anthropologist, worked among the Tonga of Northern Rhodesia, later Zambia. 
For several decades, she was confronted with an array of spirit possession cults that by 
the 1940s had partly disappeared among Plateau Tonga but were active from the 1950s 
into the mid 1960s among the Valley Tonga of Gwembe district among whom she also 
worked. In possession dances called masabe, female Valley Tonga sought to impersonate 
and represent unprecedented figures of authority, various novel objects, or surprising 
machinery that caught their attention. Colson offered a secondhand account of a wom-
an who upon seeing an airplane flying over her village spontaneously fell into a sort 
of swoon. The incident occurred around 1954, a decade before Independence from the 
British. The woman became possessed by Airplane spirit: 
»Dazed she fled to the bush, and had to be brought back to the village. She learned the 
demands of the spirit either in vision or in dreams: drum rhythms, songs, dance 
steps, the drama incorporated in phases of the dance, the articles desired by the spir-
it, and the plants required for treatment. At the first Airplane dance she was both pa-
tient and instructor, teaching drummers, chorus and attendants. After this the dance 
spread to other people, first in her own village and neighborhood and then to others 
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in the same vicinage, flowing along the path she had made. Some were possessed 
when planes flew over but apparently received no new revelations that radically al-
tered the form of the dance.« (Colson 1969: 79).
The remarkable passage describes the first Valley Tonga entered by Airplane spirit. We 
do not know whether this woman saw an airplane for the first time, nor can we be sure 
what exactly captured her attention causing so violently a reaction. Was it a specific as-
pect of the airplane’s outward appearance? The smooth metallic surface, the little dotted 
windows, the wide embrace of its wings, the elongated body? Was it the color or the 
smell, the fumes such machinery inevitably emits? Or the echoing noise it made in the 
sky while gliding weightlessly in an unfamiliar type of movement, a stiff pushing through 
clouds? The breeze it left on her face? The sight of an airplane can be many things. Unlike 
that woman, I am relatively numb to the experience of an airplane. It is very familiar to 
me. I seem to have a definite idea of it, as well as an image, which perhaps explains why it 
has become difficult for me to experience its concreteness. As Jousse would point out, the 
thing (la chose) no longer speaks to me and I can no longer hear it. A child may possibly 
be deeply emotionally stirred by the initial perception of an airplane. But it is unlikely 
the child would fall ill from apperceiving it.12 And in any case, the Tonga woman was no 
child. What is important in this passage is rather that the plane was the occasion for the 
experience of a third that interjected itself between the woman and the airplane, namely 
what Colson for lack of a better term was forced to translate as ›spirit‹. The woman was 
not possessed by an airplane, but by a spirit called Airplane. Similar to Lienhardt’s reflec-
tions on Dinka ›Powers‹, it is the nature and quality of this ›spirit‹ that usually completely 
escapes us when we try to understand such apperceptions.
The Valley Tonga called possession dances by the same name as the spirits that caused 
them. Airplane spirit – called indeki in the language of the Tonga – was a masabe spirit 
that caused Airplane dance. Following first-time possession, Tonga diviners suspected 
that others who dreamt of airplanes or became unwell were equally affected by the new 
entity and the condition it caused. If the new treatment offered relief, it confirmed the 
spirit’s presence and the medical imperative to arrange ceremonial dances. In these pro-
ductions the Tonga enacted mimetically what possessed them in dance with costumes 
and dramatic performance. Thus while Airplane dance was standardized by the first 
12 It is very unfortunate that I can no longer remember the moment when I first saw an 
airplane or became aware of its defining behaviors: a machine that moves across skies 
transporting goods and passengers. The oldest memory I have of flying in such a device 
is rather thin, a trace from when I was four years old. By that time I must have already 
flown several times before. On my first conscious flight, I was alone and cared for by a 
kind ›stewardess‹ (as ›flight attendants‹ used to be called). I remember her as very pretty. 
While I enjoyed her proximity, I have forgotten the contours of her face. The plane flew 
from Montréal (Canada) to Frankfurt (West Germany) as was explained to me much 
later. I do not remember being terrified during takeoff or landing, but only concerned 
by the absence of my proper parents, which seemed to give the experience an existential 
twist. It is entirely possible, however, that such fragmented memory traces hide more 
than they reveal of the initial experience at the time. Heaven knows what lies buried 
beneath an initial experience of flying and levitation, which began long ago in fantasy.
woman possessed, the spirit impelled other patients to move in the same characteristic 
style and confirm its presence. This particular dance, which radiated out of the Valley, in 
Chipepo, turned out to be highly contagious.
Masabe spirits were new arrivals on the local dance scene. They had appeared within 
living memory of those Tonga with whom Colson worked over several decades.13 Most 
Tonga understood the masabe to have originated from Shona speaking areas of Rhodesia 
(the Tonga word masabe probably derived from the Shona word mashave). They were 
alien spirits. Jesuit missionaries mentioned the introduction of such new spirit phenom-
ena explicitly in 1918 (Colson 1969: 94). Apparently, they emerged as a reaction to the 
introduction of the police and administrative post of the British colonial government, 
Christian missions, the railway, and the first European settlers. Most importantly, they 
afflicted mostly women and not men, the latter who worked as migrant laborers in the 
cities while leaving the former behind in the villages. They caused the afflicted to fall ill, 
have recurrent dreams, feel sadness or apathy.14 Older Tonga possession dances resem-
bling the masabe newcomers had primarily been the domain of male hunters and had 
involved dance imitation of animals (Colson 1969: 94-96).15
13 Colson speaks of several varieties of possession among the Tonga associated with dif-
ferent classes of spirits of which only some have respective mediums. Spirits were luwo 
(wind) or muuya (air or breath), because they were invisible and the Tonga knew them 
only by what they did. Basangu spirits were associated with community welfare and 
were the most prominent ones while also the rarest. They caused a solitary possession 
demanding the medium (also called basangu or ›prophet‹) to face and pronounce de-
mands to the public as intermediaries between the world of the living and the world of 
spirits. Ignoring its demands had consequences for Tonga society in general (basangu 
were mainly associated with weather). By contrast, the masabe spirits caused a more 
associative form of possession afflicting an individual medium spontaneously through 
sudden contact. This form of possession was more common at the time of her field work. 
Through the medium the spirit expressed its own desires and essential nature only to the 
person possessed. Failure to comply with the masabe spirit’s demand had consequence 
for the medium only. Masabe possession had public aspects only insofar as it involved 
elaborate dance treatments and ceremonies involving others in their performance. The 
third type of possession knew no medium and was wholly undesirable. It concerned 
ghosts of forgotten dead or spirit entities that were manipulated by sorcerers to enter a 
victim for the purpose of killing. Finally there were mizimu, ancestral spirits, who caused 
no possession in the living at all. Colson speculated that Tonga spirits might also be 
understood as forming one single class differentiated merely by the way they impinged 
upon the lives of men (Colson 1969: 69-103, esp. 70-72). 
14 The illnesses Colson listed, with the exception of oppressive dreams, seemed to have no 
direct association with the particular spirit: eye, tooth, and ear infection, concussion, 
swollen breasts, mental disturbance after childbirth, and many others (Colson 1969: 82). 
15 In many societies, hunters are mediators of the symbolic space between culture and 
wilderness (Kramer 1987: 24-29, esp. 27). Their liminal positions are expressed in the 
formation of separate communities, taboos, and other special cultic arrangements. This 
position is predicated on their topographical knowledge of the space beyond cultivated 
settlements of society, where they not seldom make contact with foreigners and other 
strange things afar. Although some of Kramer’s work has been translated into English, I 
will refer to the German originals in the following elaborations.
Die Macht des Anschaulichen
| 177
178 |
Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi
What is spirit here? Masabe are anonymous spirits and unlike other types of Ton-
ga spirits have no individual names. When they are understood to be of human origin 
masabe represent alien humanity known only by tribal and not by personal names (Col-
son 1969: 71). Indeki, Airplane spirit, is not the name of an individual airplane, nor its in-
dividual spirit as in what anthropologists used to call ›animism‹. Rather, it is the spirit of 
a class of phenomena called Airplane, and as such neither equal to a particular airplane, 
nor entirely divorced from association with it. The word that translates into ›spirit‹, here, 
is muuya, which Colson renders as breath or air, the essence that endows a phenome-
non with its essential nature. »There is something which projects itself into humans and 
makes them behave in characteristic fashion, and this is called muuya« (Colson 1969: 72-
73). Every single muuya is the essence of a class of phenomena which become manifest 
in each individual specimen of that class. These classes of phenomena include people and 
animals, but also tractors, trains, motorboats and airplanes, as they display the capability 
of independent motion. It can flow out of one specimen and enter a person displacing the 
muuya already present. The affected then assume its characteristic Gestalt as in masabe 
possession dances (Kramer 1987: 71).
Masabe spirits entered people without their volition making them ill with various 
maladies and ailments forcing them to dance (Colson 1969: 72). The medium was con-
sidered a vehicle of the spirit’s desires expressing its nature. It was addressed as masabe 
during active possession: a woman possessed by the spirit Airplane became Indeki, Air-
plane, and behaved accordingly. Once afflicted, the possessed were expected to engage 
in a sequence of three dance ceremonies in which neighbors and kin participated. Each 
event became more elaborate than the former. It involved dancing, costume, medicines, 
ceremonial forms of address as well as gifts such as soap and a feast of chicken paid by the 
kin of the medium who were obliged to function as hosts to the dance spectacle. Colson 
stressed that it remained unclear who exactly received these gifts, whether the spirit or its 
medium (Colson 1969: 76). Tobacco had to be provided to drummers and other dancers 
(Colson 1969: 86). During inactive periods, the spirit was believed to reside nearby or on 
the surface of the vehicle’s body and remained ignored. Thus in normal life the medium 
received no special treatment for her condition and close association with the spirit. 
Note that the form of possession, i.e. dance, was at once proof of affliction, part of 
a treatment, and mechanism of the cure. The latter was not reached by exorcizing the 
possessing agent, as was the case with Ajak among the Dinka. Rather the afflicted identi-
fied in a controlled manner with the respective spirit, indicated through a wrist band of 
colorful beads that marked the medium permanently with that spirit (Colson 1969: 89). 
Failure to address the demands of the spirit had consequences for the afflicted alone, not 
for society at large, unlike with other Tonga spirits. »Full recovery gave the final proof 
that Airplane spirit had been seeking to express itself through the patient who had now 
learned to cope with it«, Colson had it (1969: 80). If the spirit departed altogether, the 
medium was said to become tontolo, that is, cool (Colson 1969: 70). 
Colson offered a surprising list of masabe possession dances and the spirits that 
caused them. While older dances had mostly involved animals of the bush, some of 
which were unambiguously dangerous, or alien tribes including for example the Ma-
zungu (the spirit of the Europeans), newer dances involved more recent experiences: 
the Mapolis (the police), Matingatinga (the carrier), Matobela Injanji (railroad follow-
ers), Maregimenti (soldiers). New inexplicable equipment, too, were personified in dance 
possession such as Citima (train), Incinga (bicycle), Kanamenda (motorboat), Siacilipwe 
(bush clearer), Kandimu (boat engine). Finally, Colson mentions possession by Madance 
(European dancing) or novel spirits such as the Mangelo (the Angel) which variously 
afflicted and entered Tonga mediums (Colson 1969: 83-84).
At times, masabe dance possessions were extremely contagious. Each dance had a 
typical, recurrent, diagnostic dream imagery. The Airplane vehicle, for example, dreamt 
to be carried to the sky by an airplane and was then thrown into water (Colson 1969: 85). 
The mechanism of contagion was enhanced by the fact that the affliction accrued could 
be passed onto others. Frequently the phrase »Perhaps you wish to dance…« was used 
as a veritable threat of affliction with the new condition. The ability to send a spirit to 
others made masabe possession akin to a minor sorcery rite as it implied illness for the 
recipient. The person who directed the masabe to another was explicitly named in the 
second ceremonial dance event and received gifts by the medium’s kin. Colson pointed 
out, that the alleged senders never bothered contradicting the accusation of having sent 
the affliction, that is, to have caused the compulsion to dance. The sending of dance af-
fliction, while not necessarily a benign act, was generally accepted even if it could imply 
a certain amount of malice. The practice gave expression to daily conflicts and various 
tensions between neighbors, friends, and kin. Often, a dance followed a period of quarrel 
between spouses and easily possessed dancers were considered more volatile characters, 
quickly excited over daily trifles (Colson 1969: 81). 
Some masabe, like Airplane, spread like a flue virus and swept the Valley at a time 
of heightened turmoil for the Tonga, while others did not (Colson 1969: 90-94; Kramer 
1987: 123). »Each person possessed becomes a possible focus for the further spread of 
the dance; each dance performance is an occasion for instructing onlookers in what is 
expected of the one possessed by this spirit« (Colson 1969: 80). In other words, the dance 
ceremonies, part of the cure, were themselves contagious for those who participated. 
Even after the cure, a formerly afflicted could occasionally become possessed whenever 
an urge to move in the characteristic style emerged. Dancing could be so impressive, 
that onlookers became spontaneously possessed without having a history of the disease 
at all (Colson 1969: 82). As a matter of fact, the most spectacular forms of dance that 
Colson witnessed took place not in the curing ceremonies mentioned, but in alternative 
occasions for entertainment. In these social events, individuals improvised and, again, 
onlookers would sometimes become possessed by masabe (Colson 1969: 88). All of these 
dances were occasions for women to obtain favorable recognition for their artistic talents 
(Colson 1969: 90) and sending affliction to others could be a strategy of dancers to create 
an audience for the display of their individual skill (Colson 1969: 94).
Masabe dance possession was an exhausting exercise and could cause bruising or 
injury. It often included a rapid shuffle, falling to the ground, shaking of body parts, mov-
ing at incredible speeds, and always culminated in a violent climax. The hyperkinesis was 
an indication of the severity of the possession. The performances that Colson witnessed 
in the 1960s were truly impressive: Airplane was dressed in black leg rattles and wore 
a black male hat. The movements switched from representing a whirling propeller to a 
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district officer arriving by plane to hold a village meeting.16 The medium, or the spirit, 
was given water and scented soap to wash, a highly desired item and associated unam-
biguously with the Europeans and life in the cities. The motorboat medium, by contrast, 
was doused with water and rolled in the mud on the ground. Again, scented soap was 
demanded. Bush clearer was covered in motor oil and was dragging a metal chain behind 
her carving its way a machine might clear a path through the bush. Elephant was on all 
fours swinging her body sideways. A veritable epidemic of Madance, European dance, 
broke out in a girl’s boarding schools in 1962, in which girl after girl fell violently pos-
sessed and demanded soapy water to drink in order to perfume their bodies internally in 
the way of Westerners (Colson 1969: 92). The sounds the possessed made, too, simulated 
the respective spirits: 
»Those who have animal masabe imitate the call of the animal; Train dancers whistle 
and clank like a locomotive; Police dancers use a whistle to give drill orders; Foreign 
dancers speak in the language of their spirit’s homeland. Other dancers may need 
only to use a falsetto when they call out or address an onlooker« (Colson 1969: 87). 
Colson also described the physical onset of possession: 
»Those who have been possessed speak of a preliminary tingling in their limbs, the rapid 
beat of the pulse and the throbbing of the heart. Then comes blackness just before 
they loose consciousness in the trance, at which point they fall, the body completely 
rigid as it drops. Onlookers call out that the person is dead or unconscious, medicine 
is given, the spirit then emerges in control [having arisen, P.G.-F.]. Finally it departs 
and the dancer returns to normal« (Colson 1969: 82).
How can we understand these productions? What started with an external address 
moved inwards, into the body as affliction, and became external again through dance, 
which as cure involved other parts of the community: the way neighbors and spouses, 
kin and friends, address, oppose, and cooperate with one another. These performances 
appear like occasions to symbolize, occasions that allow relenting to the compulsion to 
dance, to move the body. They give expression to aesthetic and visceral experiences that 
are exactly not elaborated discursively, but mimetically through movement (whirling, 
pulling, swaying, rotating arms) in combination with sound (drum, whistling, foreign 
tongues, falsetto voice), smells (soap) and dress (oil on skin, black hat, leg rattles). All 
seems to be bent bringing about, lending expression, to something that compels imita-
tion, a likeness to an image that made an impression in the possessed. But if these are 
indeed images, they are not acted upon. Rather, the subject feels acted upon by them. 
That is why Colson called these productions ›dance possession‹ [emphasis mine, P.G.-F.] 
and insists to translate her material as cases of illness, disease, affliction. The passivity of 
16 It seems, then, what captured the attention of the first Airplane dancer who standardized 
these movements were the rotating propeller attached to the plane, and those strange 
fellows with head gear, stepping in and out of a pulsating vehicle.
reception is contradicted by a creativity of performance, one that includes recognition of 
individual skill and agentive action. It becomes elaborated, routinized and appropriated 
by others. The dances are contagious and unfold further along the lines of curing rituals 
and entertainment spectacles.
As in the case of the Dinka, we are confronted with an effect of the real on the body 
of the afflicted. This ›real‹, however, is not the same as ours; nor is there an immediate 
similarity between Dinka and Tonga conceptions. The phenomenal world – the things 
that impress themselves on the body through incorporation, intussusception, or inte-
gration – are pre-structured by the way the world and the elements within it become 
sensually perceived and interpreted. While we are far off from the girl enacting dog-on-
a-leash on a Greek island, masabe dance possession among the Tonga involves yielding 
to a powerful impression, one that seems to have overwhelmed the afflicted, resulting 
in the mobilization of all the senses of the body and all social relations of the group. In 
these spectacular performances, it is the surface quality of an unfamiliar thing, such as 
an airplane, that becomes the object of exploration and mimetic play. Note that the first 
encounter with the object brought forth various images that become repeated in dreams 
and visions, surpassing and supplementing what was initially apperceived. Those becom-
ing possessed do not necessarily need to perceive an actual airplane but become afflicted 
by a contagious image that details concrete aspects of the impressive object. In this play, 
more than a mere likeness is produced between an unfamiliar object and an afflicted 
subject, while the separation between subject and object appears confused in the special 
state of consciousness we usually call ›possession‹.
While the girl’s play of a dog defines a temporary obsession with unusual bodily 
motility, we do not know if she had earlier dreamt of a dog or was haunted by an image 
before she enacted her play on the beach. Her imitation defined the contours of an object 
that seemed transparent to me. Even if one were to agree with Jousse that no image pre-
ceded corporeal integration (intussusception), her concrete incarnation will undoubtedly 
provide her with a more complete understanding of what it means to be a dog on the 
beach. In the Dinka example, by contrast, an affliction presents an invasion by invisi-
ble forces that make themselves felt through various symptoms, including possession. 
These symptoms imply a decisive loss of control through contact with an array of forces 
to which the Dinka have indirect access and of which they only have a limited under-
standing. The Dinka cope with these afflictions through sacrifice, inclusive of expiation, 
exorcism, as well as mechanisms of identification and substitution. In the Tonga example, 
finally, we have an affliction triggered by something sensuously perceived on the surface 
of a new and unfamiliar object in the world. The response of the Tonga is a permanent 
identification with the afflicting agent, relenting individually, until it becomes cooled 
(tontolo), i.e. until the compulsion to dance in a particular way has ended or is replaced 
by a novel affliction. While undeniably aesthetic and explorative, it is hard to interpret 
dance possessions as providing the Tonga with an effective means to know and con-
trol the forces that possess them. Nor does it seem correct to view the Tonga as entirely 
dominated by what is external to them. The masabe become incorporated into elaborate 
curing and entertainment ceremonies in which neighbors rival one another’s skills, gifts 
are exchanged, and social relationships are renewed.
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Realism and mimesis
The German anthropologist Fritz W. Kramer understands performances such as Tonga 
dance possession, in which various novel machinery become objects of mimetic replay, 
to be founded on the Macht des Anschaulichen: »the power of the manifest« or »the pow-
er of what is seen« (Kramer 1987: 63-69). What is perceived overwhelms experience 
through its lucidity, concreteness, visibility and tangibility. Ecstatic mimesis, such as 
Tonga dance possession, involves pronouncedly the field of vision.17 It focuses attention 
on one or several aspects of a particular object by elaborating on the perceived surface 
quality of things: the red fez, a feather, a hat, fork and knife; or in the Tonga case: soap, 
a black hat, a rotating propeller. The experience of being overwhelmed (überwältigt) is 
predicated on a gaze from outside allowing focus on the surface quality of things. Here, 
isolated detail is elevated to suggestive image with an autonomous force in the creation 
of figurines, spirit-possession, or curing rites. These details are the accoutrements of the 
stranger, the foreigner, the other to one’s own culture, which become aesthetically ex-
plored in mimetic dramas (Kramer 1987: 7-11). Through mimetic play an object be-
comes separated from its original context and integrated into local practices: sculptures, 
masques, figurines, or dance performances, inclusive of the various ritual productions 
associated with them. This integration, however, expresses what is conceived as an out-
side to one’s culture, delineating a domain of cultural otherness. 
What had caused consternation or surprise is elaborated and made part of one’s 
own cultural repertoire as Fremdgeister (Kramer 1983: 377-379). The object inducing 
mimetic replay causes an experience, rendering the subject no longer in control. African 
possession usually begins with illness, sadness and affliction. Passiones is a word that in 
meaning today is somewhat removed from the English word ›passion‹ or, alternatively, 
from the German word Leidenschaften. According to Kramer, it describes a form of being 
acted-upon, for which the German language, roughly since the 17th century, no longer 
has a viable equivalent, except with reference to psychologically defined states (1987: 
91-92). It describes an experience that used to be identified more frequently by various 
concepts such as Ergriffenheit (to be grasped by something), Erfülltheit (to be filled-up by 
17 Ecstatic mimesis (ekstatische Mimesis) must be distinguished to other forms of African 
performance such as comedy theater. While these plays represent westernized locals or 
various strangers humorously, their reenactments differ from ecstatic mimesis. They im-
ply comical and critical commentary, aspects that lack in trance and possession (Kramer 
2005: 128). Ecstatic mimesis of the foreigner or the stranger usually occurs among mar-
ginal groups of society and in peripheral cults: among women, migrant laborers, and 
slaves. They concern the Zar of the Northeast, for example, or the Bori-, Hauka-, and 
Vodu-cults of West-Africa (2005: 130). Instead of comical representation, ecstatic mime-
sis include forms of dissociation and work on the basis of an economy of affect, which, 
like in traditional spirit possession, does not seek to integrate, but to ban the dangers 
confronted (133).
something), and Besessenheit (to be possessed by something).18 Passiones describe »den 
inversen Aspekt des Handelns«, the inverse aspect of acting or the inverse aspect of agency 
(Kramer 1987: 64). If anthropologists have often rendered the agent at work as ›spirit‹ or 
›force‹, the various vernacular meanings on which such translations were based should 
not be assumed unproblematic by mere academic convention. The impact of corpore-
al experience becomes collectively affirmed through such third terms. For the Tonga, 
muuya (breath) cannot be seen but is inferred by its effects and appears in dreams and 
can enter bodies (Kramer 1987: 71). It refers to what is essential and specific in a class of 
phenomena (das Gattungspezifische) (Kramer 1987: 72). It is what caused affliction when 
it entered the possessed.
The confrontation with an exotic (fremde) reality, about whom there is little prior 
knowledge, isolates the secondary traits in order to seek out the hidden dimensions in-
volved. It intensifies the aspects deemed strange in order to render them recognizable, 
albeit now in a monstrous way. The figure produced (Nachbildung) is incorporated ex-
actly by remaining at a distance to it (Kramer 1987: 8-9). Unlike what Jousse claims for 
mimetic play, there is no direct integration (intussusception) at work because the distance 
between afflicted subject and the agent of affliction is sustained and not undone. Scientif-
ic knowledge production, by contrast, tends to tame the initial address of an unfamiliar 
thing by providing a context and mustering causes for its existence. By this mechanism, 
the unfamiliarity of the object in question becomes undone. In mimesis, on the other 
hand, the object becomes aesthetically explored and dramatized, exaggerated and isolat-
ed by integration into a new symbolic context that makes it independent from its origin. 
The result is frequently astonishing and often appears demonic. Such a gaze from outside 
can be negatively qualified as ›superficial‹ only if one insists that knowing an object neces-
sitates overcoming its unfamiliar address through assimilation, i.e. the elimination of the 
object’s otherness in a process of mental cognition that negates the initial experience of 
apperception (what psychoanalysis would refer to as sekundäre Bearbeitung – secondary 
revision). Instead of Ergriffenheit, one gets Erklärung; instead of being grasped by some-
thing, one provides an explanation thus arresting the unfamiliar quality of the object, the 
primäre Erfahrung des Fremden (Kramer 2005: 143). 
Focusing on the surface quality of things can be understood as the opposite strategy: 
a keen interest in isolating that which caused consternation, for example, the very power 
that rendered someone possessed. By serving to signify the other to one’s own culture, 
such an operation constitutes a form of artistic realism concerned with the immediate 
givens of experience: the concision and rhythm of the form perceived. The other, or the 
strange, is hence not assimilated, if we understand under that term the application of 
procedures of rational explanation (Erklärung) or understanding (Verstehen). Realist 
18 Kramer is influenced here by an older generation of German anthropologists, sociolo-
gists, and psychiatrists, most of whom are poorly known in the anglophone world to-
day. Compare various contributions in Jürgen Zutt’s Ergriffenheit und Besessenheit als 
kulturanthropologisches Problem, such as Ernst Benz (1972: 125-148), W. E. Mühlmann 
(1972: 69-79) and Zutt himself (1972: 11-24); as well as the introductory commentary 
in another edited volume on the relation between sociology and anthropology by René 
König (1984: 17-35). 
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representations such as in Tonga dance performances are offered in a register that is akin 
to what constitutes the operation of day-dreaming, an exploration not yet made entirely 
coherent through secondary elaboration but faithful to the initial experience of address. 
It is these images that provided the material for three consecutive Tonga dance perfor-
mances. Located somewhere between, but never equal to, what we usually understand as 
art, performance, dream work, ritual, possession, trance, theater, and figurative realism, 
such ›images of passiones‹, Kramer had it, take seriously the encounter with the other to 
one’s own specific culture: »das Andere der jeweils eigenen Kultur« (Kramer 1987: 10). 
From an anthropologist’s perspective, which is securely locked within a scientific 
register, this imagery of the other is very much part of the society in which it becomes 
expressed, because it forms part of how that society conceptualizes its own externality. It 
forms part of its cosmology, which in many African societies traditionally implies a space 
beyond the confines of settled life, namely, the bush or the wilderness (Kramer 1987: 
56-63). In Dinka society this opposition was expressed through the distinction between 
the wilds and the homestead – roor and bai (Lienhardt 1961: 63). What addressed the 
Tonga in various modern machinery like the airplane, was the wilderness from which 
the Europeans were seen to hail, similar to the »free-divinities« of the Dinka (but not 
necessarily the ›clan-divinities‹ associated with ancestral kinship). It was into a culturally 
constituted outside into which the unfamiliar new machinery was integrated and thus 
remained to an important degree part of an unknown, but not entirely novel, domain of 
wilderness. In masabe dance possession, the unfamiliarity of what confronted the Tonga, 
never became assimilated into familiar forms of knowledge (Sinnverstehen), but mimeti-
cally replayed as an address from beyond.
For Kramer such mimetic representations are realist interpretations (1987: 8). Real-
ism, following Erich Auerbach, is understood as the interpretation of reality (Wirklich-
keit) through mimesis. In Auerbach, mimesis was understood as literary Darstellung or 
Nachahmung –representation or imitation (Auerbach 2001 [1946]: 515). Kramer intro-
duced the term mimesis because he saw rational factors as secondary in mimetic behav-
ior, especially in the context of dance possession: 
»Im realistischen Roman geht es, wie in der afrikanischen Besessenheit, nicht um eine 
rationale Erkenntnis von Ordnungen und Zusammenhängen, wie etwa in der mod-
ernen Ethnographie, sondern um intuitiv erfaßte, suggestive Bilder, die den Autor, 
sei es des Textes oder des Tanzes, überwältigen« (Kramer 1987: 145-246).19 
Mimetic behavior cannot be assimilated to forms of instrumental action even if it occurs 
in concrete contexts in which certain social and individual functions are easily identified 
(Kramer 1987: 239). Possession is experienced as a form of invasion or coercion (Zwang) 
and the afflicted do not understand their condition as purposeful action following a clear-
19 »In the realistic novel, as well as in African possession, the concern is not the rational un-
derstanding of the order of things and their interconnections, as it is for modern ethnog-
raphy; rather at issue are intuitively apprehended, suggestive images, which overwhelm 
an author, be that an author of a text or the author of a dance« (translation P.G.-F.) 
ly defined aim, nor as inherently useful activity. One is only possessed by what has no 
useful purpose, hailing from a domain from which one is excluded (Kramer 1987: 103). 
Possession is the opposite of conversion, which is predicated on assimilation. And yet, in 
the vibrant productions described above, a creative labor is clearly perceivable. In the Eu-
ropean tradition, however, there is only one concept that does not pose a contradiction 
between creativity, associated with Kunst (art) and possession (Besessenheit) – the former 
suggesting individual agency while the later complicating the notion (Kramer 1987: 240). 
That term is mimesis, which since Plato has been associated negatively with the ›irrati-
onal‹. Plato dismissed mimesis as means for the attainment of truth, exemplified by the 
inspired poet, actor and orator, who may speak as someone whom they are not. His was 
the context of the onset of writing and thus he preferred diegesis, narrative and plot. Aris-
toteles, in turn, defined mimesis as an anthropological constant: human beings imitate 
in order to represent nature. In African ecstatic mimesis, by contrast, states of possession 
force upon the subject the compulsion to imitate and resemble an other, someone that is 
different and not equal to the subject. What enters the body of the medium, however, is 
not simply what was seen, but the invisible dimension of it, like muuya among the Tonga, 
characterizing an entire class of phenomena (Kramer 2005: 131). As ›spirit‹ this other is 
part of reality and while it must be held at a distance, it nonetheless strives to become 
expressed (Kramer 1987: 241). It belongs to the domain of the wilderness conceptualized 
as the inverse to rational order and represents a form of power. Aristotle did not specify 
if imitation in art entailed the enactment of resemblances or differences. Yet this is a key 
question for modern anthropology. For Aristotle, mimesis was the very cause for poetic 
creativity. And who could deny that in poetry one is possessed by the word?
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